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Transfigurings – beauty, wonder and the noumenal 
H M Evans 
 
Paper presented at the ‘Transfigurings: The World, Wonder and Beauty’ Symposium, 
Durham University, Centre for Medical Humanities and Institute of Advanced Studies, 
14 June 2012. 
 
 
Encounter (1) The ash tree at twilight – an epiphany explored 
I was simply standing in the garden one evening looking at the late spring sky above 
me, through the canopy of a large ash tree whose every leaf and twig was picked out 
in black against the indigo sky. As my eyes adjusted to the dwindling light, the three 
dimensional array of the tree’s infinitely elaborate structure fixated me, and I was 
able to savour its precise and almost granular penetration of the air around it. The 
space it occupied in turn seemed to take on the quality of a mould, a mould of 
minute intricacy whose every hollow channel was perfectly fitted by the filigree of 
tree-stuff that had, as it were, been poured or breathed into it. Although in one 
sense a more unscientific view of the tree’s actual growth could hardly be imagined, 
the perception of the tree’s infusing a space that was ready to receive it does have a 
picturesque relation to the Darwinian thought that living things exist simply and 
precisely because they can, and that every grain of organic nature occupies that 
location to which it is, at the time of occupation, most perfectly fitted. Finally, like so 
much aspect-perception, this perception too could after a while be switched at will 
with the ordinary perception of the tree as fixed, the fluid air flowing and wrapping 
gently around it. It was, if you like, an altered conception of space and form, and it 
was most definitely wonderful while it lasted. 
 
What I mean by ‘transfigurings’ 
One of the fundamental groups of questions in philosophy concerns the relation 
between on the one hand the world as the object of our knowledge, and on the 
other hand our nature as knowers, in some sense shaping the world that we take 
ourselves to know. We are, after all, part of the world. Does the way we know the 
world conform to the way the world is, objectively and independently of us? Or does 
the world itself conform to the ways in which we and our knowledge and perception 
are structured (whether biologically, or culturally, or both)? Do our minds fit the 
world, or does the world fit our minds? Both the sense of beauty and the sense of 
wonder sharpen this question – they make it more than usually intense, and – if this 
be possible – more than usually important. The world seen under the aspects of 
beauty, under the aesthetic gaze, and the world seen under the aspect of wonder, 
seen in a state of wonder, seems intensified and changed. Whether this means the 
world itself is changed, or that we ourselves are changed, is a moot point within this 
fundamental philosophical debate. But clearly something is changed. For the 
purposes of our conversations today, I’m going to call such changes ‘transfigurings’. 
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Seeing things differently 
In seeing something transfigured, we see it changed from its prior state or aspect. In 
seeing the beautiful, or in seeing the wonderful, we are also seeing something that is 
extraordinary. If our staple diet of experience were full of wonder, or full of beauty, 
then we should hardly notice the wonderful or the beautiful. But they are categories 
that pick out sharp contrasts from the usual or the ordinary. Seeing beautiful or 
wonderful aspects of the world means seeing the world differently from before. A 
number of interesting questions immediately arise: is the difference something 
that’s available for everyone to see, or does it reside within the beholder’s eye 
alone? How might it be shared and conveyed? Is it permanent? Is the difference 
something that we can learn to see at will, habitually? Or must beauty and wonder 
always take us by surprise, unlooked-for (like, perhaps, humility)? I’m not going to 
address these questions directly, but we may return to them in discussion. 
Meanwhile I want to suggest a provisional distinction between beauty and wonder, 
leaving them nonetheless as powerful agencies of transfiguring. I’m going to suggest 
that the aesthetic transfigures the world within reason, and that wonder transfigures 
it beyond reason. I now have to say what I mean by that, and doubtless I’ll also have 
to row back a little from it; but I hope the point of the distinction will achieve 
something. 
 
The aesthetic – the world transfigured within reason 
The aesthetic – ‘beauty’ is the name of its most cherished bestowal – changes the 
world’s aspect. We see the world differently when we discern the aspect of the 
beautiful. We bring to the world a framing and an editing that illuminates some 
things, mutes others, shades others out altogether, and discloses a pattern or a 
figure (a trans-figure) of elegance and symmetry, or their acute contraries, where 
previously in un-altered vision we saw something different, in some sense something 
lesser, something workaday, utilitarian, un-joined, or joined for merely practical 
purposes. The world experienced as beautiful is continuous with the world as we 
previously experienced it – transfigured ‘within reason’ as I’m calling it – but the 
change involves our seeing differently and engaging the world-as-beautiful more 
exuberantly and intently. Its value, its very thing-ness (or ipseity) is intensified. 
 
Wonder – the world transfigured beyond reason 
By contrast I suggest that the world seen as wonderful is liable to be discontinuous 
with the world-as-mundane. The change is a change in us as much as in the world, 
perhaps, but – for the wonderer – the change in the world is radical; perhaps even 
irrevocable. Wonder does not isolate the extraordinary from the ordinary, as 
curiosity might. Rather in wonder the ordinary becomes extraordinary. Wonder 
defies the ordinary; it dissolves the ordinariness of what we see as wonderful. 
Wonder invites us to suspend some of our prior categories of experiencing and 
knowing. I suggest that the world experienced in wonder is to that extent 
discontinuous with the world of ordinary experience. This is a transfiguring ‘beyond 
reason’. We confront a change in what we take the world to be, or in how we take it 
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to operate, or in how we realise it can be accessed. Some fraction of the world 
becomes – even if only for a moment – newly present to us. 
 
What I mean by wonder – a provisional definition 
Writing on the place of wonder in the clinical encounter,(1) I have suggested that 
wonder characterises 
 
…a special kind of transfiguring encounter between us and something other 
than us. Wonder is a very particular attitude of special attentiveness (very 
much an attitude rather than an emotion) that arises within us, an attitude 
prompted by circumstances that may be entirely ordinary yet, through our 
active and responsive imagination, yield an object in which the ordinary is 
transfigured by and suffused with something extraordinary as well. The 
attitude of wonder is thus one of altered, compellingly-intensified attention 
to something that we immediately acknowledge as somehow important – 
something that might be unexpected, that in its fullest sense we certainly do 
not yet understand, and towards which we will likely want to turn our faculty 
of understanding; something whose initial appearance to us engages our 
imagination before our understanding; something at that moment larger and 
more significant than ourselves; something in the face of which we 
momentarily set aside our own concerns (and even our self-conscious 
awareness, in the most powerful instances). 
 
More could be said of course, but it seems to me that this will do well enough for 
our purposes today. 
 
Encounter (2) The shared world of un-shareable experiences 
Sometimes the Kantian thought, that the world cannot be as it appears to us 
because it cannot be only as it appears to us, comes vividly to life. Standing on a 
sandy beach with a seagull screeching and cavorting over my head, the thought is 
forced upon me that we are surrounded by moving perspectives upon the world, 
each carving its own track across and through the three-dimensional field of possible 
perceptions. This ‘carving’ is true not only of me as an individual, nor simply also of 
other humans whose perceptions could be very like mine, but also of other kinds of 
creatures entirely – birds, fish, countless thousands of insects and rodents and 
worms along the shore not so many metres away from me – whose perceptions 
must be very unlike and in most cases unimaginably unlike my own. 
 
We all move (walk, swim, crawl, fly) in a three-dimensional field of perceptual 
possibility, intercepting the radiated light and sound and warmth and pressure and 
other waves as they coincide in any particular point. We swim seamlessly from one 
such point to its immediate neighbour, too quickly to be consciously aware of the 
minute gradations of change. Every wave of light or sound or heat or pressure 
radiates from a point at the centre of what we might call ‘a sphere of perceivability’. 
For our practical purposes there are infinitely many such points, their 
correspondingly many spheres overlapping and interlocking in an unimaginably 
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complicated symphony – the natural, spontaneous, organised display of reality, in a 
simultaneous multitude of forms that satisfy the perceptual apparatus of every 
creature moving within and across the field. 
 
The seagull arrows across this field along an invisible track that I could never follow; 
and if by some contrivance I could do so, it would be at speeds very different from 
the gull’s; and if by further contrivance I could mimic exactly the gull’s track and 
speed and survive the experience, I would still realise perceptual possibilities 
constrained by my own senses and not by the gull’s. I can’t experience her world nor 
she mine; yet we live in a common reality underlying (or displaying or expressing 
itself as) both our worlds – and untold billions of other worlds, all shared to varying 
extents but no two identical. 
 
On the world, the body, the mind and experience 
One of Kant’s many seminal realisations was that the way we experience the world – 
the general forms that all our experiences must necessarily take – cannot themselves 
be experienced, yet can still be deduced (2) (see especially pp 120-175). The three 
chief examples are space, time, and causality (the relation of causes and effects), 
framing the form of all our experiences. We know about these conditions through 
reflecting upon what our experiences are like, and indeed must be like. But we 
cannot have direct experience of space, time, or causation – only their results. We 
experience events in time and objects extended in space, but we have no experience 
of time as such, rather than of events in time; and we have no experience of space as 
such rather than of objects in space. Crucially, space, time and causation for Kant are 
forms imposed upon our experience by our own minds. They are part of the 
apparatus of experience – and are presupposed by, and lie behind rather than 
within, any actual experience. They are themselves nowhere to be found (even the 
term ‘nowhere’ presupposes space, and ‘finding’ presupposes both time and 
causation!). 
 
Then following Kant, one of Schopenhauer’s many seminal realisations was that our 
minds are the way they are through arising within us as part of our distinctive 
material nature.(3) As Simon Blackburn puts it so succinctly, for Schopenhauer the 
mind is ‘subservient to the life of the organism’(4) – the mind is controlled by and 
functions within the conditions imposed by our material make-up, which includes 
not only the Kantian categories of thought but something more obscure (and partly 
darker) as well, a more primal and general urging which Schopenhauer sees as the 
operation of something that he calls ‘will’ (rather misleadingly, as it turns out(5)). In 
realising this material conditioning of the mind, and in particular its hidden-ness 
from our experience, Schopenhauer was of course anticipating one of the 
fundamentals of psychoanalytic doctrine. 
 
Now put these two realisations together. Our material nature, our lives as organisms 
of a particular kind, frame and constrain the nature of our minds. But in their turn, 
our minds frame and constrain the kinds of experiences that we can have. Since 
(through our material nature) the world does govern the form that our minds take, 
then our minds do ‘fit the world’. Yet at the same time, the way the world appears to 
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us in experience is also governed by the framing conditions imposed by our minds, 
something we can deduce but not directly experience. So in this larger sense, our 
minds do govern the form in which the world appears to us – the world does ‘fit our 
minds’. Between them, Kant and Schopenhauer seem to have provided a synthetic 
account of the source, of our experience of the world and our place within it, that 
some think has still not been surpassed almost two hundred years later. 
 
The world as presented; the world as capable of presentation; the world 
behind presentation 
Following Kant and Schopenhauer, we realise that the world is necessarily capable of 
presenting itself to us in ways that we are evolved to perceive it – otherwise those 
perceptions could not be obtained, and they are obtained; but this is true both of me 
as a human and also of the seagull (and the fish and the worm), each of them 
equipped to perceive the world in ways that I am not. The world supports the 
irreconcilable perceptions of us all, fish, beetles, birds, people.  
 
That the world supports all of these experiences simultaneously – and, for each 
experiencer, exclusively – shows that none of us has nor could have, even in 
principle, anything more than a minutely partial experience of the world. All these 
experiences are true and real, but none conveys anything like the whole display of 
the world; which is to say, that none conveys more than a fractional representation 
of reality, a fractional representation of the world as it is. 
  
In a philosophical context, the radical incompleteness of perceptual experience 
matters because it affirms one view of reality against others, proclaiming that whilst 
the world has a reality that is independent of us, underlying our very real experience, 
and presenting itself to us in ways that we are capable of apprehending, it also 
speaks to other creatures in ways in which it must remain silent to us. Beyond that 
fraction of the world’s appearances that we are fitted to receive, the world is 
unknowable. (For a genuinely thrilling, as well as convincing, pursuit of this 
conclusion, see Bryan Magee’s philosophical autobiography, which remains in my 
view the most irresistible invitation to philosophy available.(6))  
 
Conceiving the noumenal 
I think we’ve now arrived at the daunting thought that there is, after all, a world ‘as 
it is in itself’ forever beyond our experience of it; through reasoning, we can affirm 
that there is; and through reasoning we must confront the fact that we can never 
know what it is like (though we can say a good deal about what it is not like). I grant 
that this conclusion is daunting and controversial, but I find myself driven to sharing 
it nonetheless. If we are to consider at all the notion of a reality underlying the world 
of experience, Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s term for it – the noumenal – will do as 
well as any other. (They differed somewhat about what could be said about it, but 
the differences needn’t concern us today.) The noumenal is, then, that aspect of 
reality that must underlie our experiences, although it can never feature in our 
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experiences. (Our experiences, in turn, constitute that aspect of reality that is 
presented to us – the phenomenal.) 
 
A familiar objection to the idea of the noumenal is that it involves needlessly 
multiplying the number of entities in existence; the short reply is that it doesn’t, but 
simply acknowledges the limitations upon how much of reality it is open to us to 
experience.(5) (See especially chapters 5 and 6.) A second familiar objection is that it 
commits us to making moves in metaphysics and that to make moves in metaphysics 
is somehow discreditable; the short answer is that not only is metaphysics not 
discreditable, it is not even avoidable in thinking about our experience of the world: 
any attempt to say what reality consists in is by definition a story in metaphysics, and 
this is just as true of the view that the world of appearances is all that there is to 
reality, as it is of the view that appearances cannot be the whole of reality. 
 
A third objection is that it is of no practical use to think about such questions. There 
are two responses to this. The first is that it was thinking about precisely such 
questions that led Kant and Schopenhauer between them to make what Magee 
regards as the greatest advance in western abstract thought for two thousand years, 
understanding clearly for the first time the relation between experience and reality. 
(6) The second response is that not all important questions need practical uses for 
their justification. Aesthetic theories about the nature of beauty would lose their 
point, perhaps even their very meaning, if they were confined to questions of what is 
merely useful. 
 
Finally, it may be objected that the noumenal is a mystical, spiritual, or even religious 
notion which rational people should leave well alone. I hope I’ve already shown how 
‘the noumenal’ names an aspect of reality that we disclose precisely by reasoned 
argument. However it might be that cold reason is sometimes augmented by 
unsettling experiences – such as the experiences of the world altered through 
beauty and wonder – whose attempted description does seem to border on the 
mystical. I’ve described two personal instances so far, without yet acknowledging 
this. Let me briefly describe a third such experience, and see what we might make of 
it. 
 
Encounter (3) The ‘St Anne’ Prelude 
In March of 2010 I had occasion to take part in an event in Durham Cathedral, at the 
end of which I had to join a procession walking ceremonially out of the sanctuary. As 
we rose and began walking, the organ sounded – the processional voluntary was a 
piece of music I’m reasonably sure I’d never heard before, though it was instantly 
recognisable as Bach. However, and much more important, it was music that 
sounded as though it announced the beginning and ending of all music. The opening 
chords, consisting of the simplest elements in diatonic music – the harmonic 
framework that underlies the music with which we are familiar in the West – 
seemed to present those elements for the very first time. After the first four bars, 
my heart stood still, and I even momentarily stopped walking – very awkward if you 
are marching in a procession! Somehow I recovered my wits, but I can remember 
nothing but the music until we were outside the Cathedral. The music was Bach’s 
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Prelude and Fugue for organ in E flat major, known popularly as the ‘St Anne’; I 
daresay some of you know it, and if you do then you might wonder how I as a 
reasonably active musician myself could have survived until the age of 54 without 
coming across it. If you are not familiar with it, then how can I convey to you its 
sublime majesty and authority? 
 
If you have not heard the St Anne Prelude, imagine that you are climbing a cloud-
covered hill on the other side of which lies a city you have never seen. As you reach 
the top of the hill, the clouds part and before you lies a landscape, and a city within 
it, of such breathtaking beauty that it makes everything you’ve seen up till that point 
seem drab and dull. Or imagine that you witnessed the first coming-to-life of human 
figures that you had previously supposed to be statues, incapable of movement. Or 
imagine that you are in a darkened library, with a rare and vital book open before 
you, but it is unreadable in the gloom – then the heavy curtains open and sunlight 
falls full upon the page. Or that the light shone in all the time from outside, yet you 
had never learned to read – and in a moment’s inspiration the power of reading fell 
into your mind. Or, perhaps closest of all, imagine that you stood before a mighty 
instrument – a cathedral organ will do fine – that had never been played, nor 
anything like it. And then for the first time there or anywhere in the world it burst 
forth in sound. 
 
This music was like that, like all of those. Even now – after perhaps a hundred 
listenings and attempted playings on my part – in hearing or even merely imagining 
in my head the gravity of those opening bars, I feel as if music has been revealed to 
me for the first time. I feel as though I now have the source from which all other 
music comes, and the landmark towards which all other music points and in relation 
to which all other music is orientated. I would even go so far as to say that, if my life 
ended tomorrow, it is more nearly complete as a result of hearing and 
understanding the opening of the St Anne Prelude than it would have been 
otherwise. 
 
Wonder: glimpsing the noumenal? 
I earlier described wonder as transfiguring the world beyond reason. The world seen 
– or heard – as wonderful is discontinuous with the world as ordinarily experienced. 
It is as though in wonder we glimpse something of a structure or order underlying 
the reality of ordinary experience: an order normally inaccessible to us, making an 
alternative sense out of chaos. I do not suggest this is always a happy experience. 
For the poet Philip Larkin, the glimpsing may be terrible – disclosing the contingency 
of our individual consciousness in a blind and inexplicable materiality, for instance. 
Here is how he describes the casual sight of a gravely ill patient being loaded into an 
ambulance. 
 
Then children strewn on steps or road,  
Or women coming from the shops  
Past smells of different dinners, see  
A wild white face that overtops  
Red stretcher-blankets momently  
As it is carried in and stowed,  
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And sense the solving emptiness  
That lies just under all we do,  
And for a second get it whole,  
So permanent and blank and true. [my emphasis](7)  
 
Experiences of wonder come in many forms; beauty may not always accompany 
them, nor (of course) the reverse. But they have in common the sense that corner of 
a veil is momentarily lifted – before falling back into place. 
 
A concluding thought 
In this sense the world is if anything even more full of wonder than it is of beauty; 
but both involve a transfiguring that, in turn, involves us in seeing differently. 
Whether in the process we are ourselves transfigured is a question for another day. 
 
HME, 14
th
 June 2012 
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